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Although intuitive-automatic processes sometimes lead to systematic biases in judgment and 
choice, in many situations especially this kind of processes enables people to approximate ra-
tional choices.  In complex base-rate tasks with repeated outcome feedback we observed choices 
which were in line with the Bayes’ solution in 86% of the cases and which were made within a 
relatively short time (i.e., 2.2 seconds).  The results indicate reliance on extremely well-
calibrated intuition.  This view is supported by the findings that choice proportions are almost 
perfectly predicted by posterior probabilities (r = .93), and that error rates, response times and 
confidence ratings are highly correlated with inconsistency in the provided information.  Our 
results support the hypothesis that parallel constraint satisfaction models may account for the 
processes underlying intuition and make the application of simple heuristics and deliberate 
strategies very unlikely.  Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, implications for economic and 
psychological modeling are outlined. 
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Base-rate Neglect and Intuition 
To be successful in a fundamentally uncertain world, individuals have to make a multitude of 
judgments and decisions based on probabilistic information.  Research on judgment and decision 
making has repeatedly shown systematic biases in probability assessment and in applying the 
rules of probability (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Reyna, 2004; Slovic, 1987).  One of the most prominent and well established findings is indi-
viduals’ neglect of base-rate probabilities.
1  This has been, for instance, demonstrated in the fol-
lowing task (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980):  
Two cab companies, Blue and Green, operate in a given city.  Eighty-five percent of 
the cabs in the city are Blue, and the remaining 15% are Green.  A cab was involved 
in a hit-and-run accident at night.  A witness later identified the cab as a Green cab.  
The court tested the witness’ ability to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs un-
der nighttime visibility conditions.  The witness was able to identify each color cor-
rectly about 80% of the time, but confused it with the other color about 20% of the 
time.  What is the probability that the accident was caused by the Green company?  
To answer this question, both the base rate of green cabs (15%) and the validity of the eyewit-
ness (80%) have to be taken into account.  However, most people consider only the latter and 
give the answer that signals neglect of the base rate, namely 80%.  There have been several at-
tempts to explain base-rate neglect and to provide solutions to solve the problem (for an over-
view see Barbey & Sloman, 2007).  In line with earlier approaches (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983), Barbey and Sloman proposed that base-rate neglect is due to associative / intuitive (i.e., 
system 1) judgment strategies that fail to adequately represent the structure of the problem.  Our 
research empirically tests and expands this intriguing theory.  In line with Hammond, Hamm, 
Grassia, and Pearson (1987) and with recent findings in gambling decisions (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008a) and probabilistic inference tasks (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c) we argue that choices based 
on intuition approximate a weighted compensatory information integration that can be explained 
by parallel constraint satisfaction (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004).  
Contrary to research that focuses on highlighting the shortcomings in human cognitive capacity, 
we aim to show empirically that although sometimes being mislead by the context, these proc-
esses can enable individuals to make quick choices that approximate a rational solution accord-
ing to Bayes’ theorem, even in rather complex tasks and without knowledge how to deliberately 
apply it. 
Based on our findings and taking an interdisciplinary perspective, in the discussion we critically 
address the misleading classification of deliberate processes as “rational” and intuitive processes 
as “irrational”  and provide a different account of the long-standing controversy between (clas-
sic) economic modeling and psychological approaches to human decision making concerning the 
                                        
 
1   Note that “base-rate neglect” does not mean that base-rates are completely ignored but that they are given not 
sufficient weight in a judgment or decision (cf. Koehler, 1996). 
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homo oeconomicus assumption (e.g., Lopes, 1994; Smith, 2005).  Finally, we make a suggestion 
that might allow for more precise behaviorally informed economic modeling of base-rate tasks. 
Findings on Base-rate Neglect 
One of the early insights in research on base-rate neglect was that people order information by its 
perceived degree of relevance, and let high-relevance information sometimes dominate low-
relevance information (e.g., Bar-Hillel, 1980).  The context influences the perceived relevance of 
base-rates and of other predictive information.  In the cab company example, the relevance of the 
base-rate (i.e., probability of green cabs) for the problem is by many persons perceived to be 
low.  Thus, the mental representation of the problem (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Johnson-Laird, 
1983) might be constructed based on the eyewitness information only.  However, the relevance 
of the base-rate can be easily increased, for instance by increasing the specificity of the base-rate 
information, which reduces base-rate neglect at least partially (Bar-Hillel, 1980).  Base-rate ne-
glect seems to be independent of response format.  Although base-rate neglect has been classi-
cally investigated using judgments of posterior probabilities as dependent variables (e.g., Bar-
Hillel, 1980; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), it has also been observed for 
choices (e.g., Goodie & Fantino, 1999; Kleiter et al., 1997).   
Several factors influence the prevalence and the size of base-rate neglect (Koehler, 1996).  For 
example, monetary incentives can decrease the extent of base-rate neglect (Brase, Fiddick, & 
Harries, 2006), as well as providing information in natural frequency format (Gigerenzer & Hof-
frage, 1995; but see Kleiter et al., 1997).  However, the reasons for the latter is likely not a natu-
ral capability for frequency processing, as originally proposed, but the mere fact that frequencies 
sometimes make it easier to construct adequate mental representations (Fiedler, Brinkmann, 
Betsch, & Wild, 2000; Kleiter et al., 1997).  Furthermore, some evidence exists that individuals 
might be trained sufficiently to take base-rates into account more properly (Sedlmeier & Giger-
enzer, 2001).  Finally, base-rate neglect has also been investigated in experiments in which indi-
viduals were not explicitly provided with probabilistic information but learned base-rates and 
cue-validities by direct experience (Goodie & Fantino, 1999). 
Research Paradigm 
Our goal in the current study is to investigate individuals’ intuitive choice behavior and the un-
derlying mental mechanisms.  Therefore, we use complex tasks with multiple cues and direct 
feedback.  We assume that for such tasks individuals are usually unable to deliberately calculate 
correct solutions without sufficient prior training and hence have to rely on their intuition or 
might alternatively use simple deliberate heuristics such a lexicographic or equal weight strate-
gies (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988).  We investigate choices between two options with dif-4 
ferent base-rates and additional information from three probabilistic cues with explicitly stated 
predictive accuracy (a priori cue validity
2):  
There is a lottery with two outcomes A and B.  Outcome A has a 85% probability of 
occurring, outcome B occurs with 15% probability.  There are three forecasters that 
make predictions of whether A or B will turn up.  
The predictions of the first forecaster are correct in 75% of the cases, the predictions 
of the second forecaster are correct in 65% of the cases, and the predictions of the 
third forecaster are correct in 55% of the cases.  All predictions are made independ-
ently and without knowledge of the distribution of outcomes in the lottery.  The pre-
dictions are: 
Forecaster 1: B 
Forecaster 2: B 
Forecaster 3: A 
Which outcome will show up?  
The posterior probability for option A, p(A | cues, base-rate), according to Bayes’ theorem is  
55.4%.
3  Thus, outcome A is more likely and should be selected.  In our study, participants 
worked on a set of such tasks and then were provided with instant feedback whether they se-
lected the correct answer or not. 
Hypotheses 
According to previous findings in probabilistic inference decisions (Bröder, 2003; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008c) we expected that individuals have the cognitive capability to integrate cues and 
base-rate information appropriately using intuitive processes.  We expected greater base-rate ne-
glect in the early trials but a calibration of the mental representations after repeated outcome 
feedback.  According to the parallel constraint satisfaction approach to intuitive judgment and 
decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, & 
Holyoak, 2004) choices should follow a weighted linear integration of base-rate information and 
cues, which approximates the normative solution according to Bayes’ theorem quite well.
4  Re-
sponse times should peak and confidence should reach its minimum in tasks in which the evi-
                                        
2   We assume that the a priori cue validity is equal for both outcomes and defined as p(cue predicts A | A)= 
p(cue predicts B | B). 
3  The solution can be calculated by: 
554 .
45 . * 65 . * 75 . * 15 . 55 . * 35 . * 25 . * 85 .
55 . * 35 . * 25 . * 85 .
) 1 ( * ) ( * ) ( * )) ( 1 ( ) ( * ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * ) (
) ( * ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * ) (
) , , , | (






− − + − −
− −
=
c c c c c c
c c c
p p p BR p p p p BR p
p p p BR p
BR c c c A p
 
 
4   Note that other models, such as decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) or random support 
theory (Brenner, Griffin, & Koehler, 2005), allow for similar predictions concerning choices. 5 
dence is most inconsistent.  Highest inconsistency is reached if base-rate and cue information 
taken together speak equally strong for option A and B.  Hence, the consistency of a task was 
operationalized as the absolute deviation of the posterior probability from .50. 
Experiment 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and one students (76 female; mean age = 21.4 years) from 
the University of Erfurt participated in a 35-minute-long experiment, which was part of a one-
hour experimental battery of thematically unrelated studies.  Students received a flat payment of 
6 Euros (approximately $8.80) for their participation and additionally performance-contingent 
payments between 0.78 and 2.76 Euros.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a deter-
ministic or a probabilistic learning condition (Learning).  In the deterministic learning condition, 
individuals received perfect Bayesian feedback, which means that their choice was considered to 
be correct if the posterior probability of the chosen option was larger than .50.  In the probabilis-
tic feedback condition, the outcome was determined using a random procedure and compared 
with the choice.  If the posterior probability was .80 for option A, option A was drawn with a 
probability of .80 but option B was drawn with a probability of .20.  Accordingly, it was possible 
to lose even when the normatively correct option was selected (i.e., non-fitting choice).  Partici-
pants earned 0.02 Euro for each correct/fitting choice and lost the same amount of money for a 
wrong/non-fitting choice.  As introduced in the example above, tasks with a base-rate and three 
probabilistic cues with dichotomous cue values were used.  Tasks were manipulated within par-
ticipants along the factors Base-rate and Cue Pattern.  For Base-rate, all levels from .05 to .95 in 
steps of .05 were selected.  For Cue Pattern, all eight (i.e., 2
3) possible combinations of dichoto-
mous cue predictions were used.  This resulted in a 2 (Learning) x 19 (Base-rate) x 8 (Cue Pat-
tern) mixed-model design with the second and third factor being manipulated within participants. 
Materials and procedure. The 152 tasks and the respective posterior probabilities are shown in 
Figure 1.  Green (red) cells indicate clear evidence for option A (option B).  Yellow cells indi-
cate choices with inconsistent information in which the posterior probability was between .33 
and .66.  First, our participants were introduced to the task (Figure 2) and to the incentive 
scheme.  They were informed about the (a priori) validity of the forecasters (forecaster 1: 75%, 
forecaster 2: 65%, forecaster 3: 55%) and that a cue with a validity of 50% has no predictive 
power.  The validity and the presentation order of the forecasters remained stable throughout the 
experiment.  Choices were made by mouse click and the time interval from stimulus onset to the 
selection of the gamble was recorded (i.e., response time).  6 
Figure 1 
 
Base-Rate A A-A-A B-A-A A-B-A A-A-B B-B-A B-A-B A-B-B B-B-B
0.05 0.26 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01
0.10 0.43 0.08 0.18 0.34 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.02
0.15 0.55 0.12 0.26 0.45 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.03
0.20 0.63 0.16 0.33 0.53 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.04
0.25 0.69 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.07 0.14 0.31 0.05
0.30 0.74 0.24 0.46 0.66 0.09 0.18 0.36 0.06
0.35 0.79 0.29 0.52 0.71 0.11 0.21 0.42 0.07
0.40 0.82 0.34 0.57 0.75 0.13 0.25 0.47 0.09
0.45 0.85 0.38 0.62 0.79 0.15 0.29 0.52 0.11
0.50 0.87 0.43 0.66 0.82 0.18 0.34 0.57 0.13
0.55 0.89 0.48 0.71 0.85 0.21 0.38 0.62 0.15
0.60 0.91 0.53 0.75 0.87 0.25 0.43 0.66 0.18
0.65 0.93 0.58 0.79 0.89 0.29 0.48 0.71 0.21
0.70 0.94 0.64 0.82 0.91 0.34 0.54 0.76 0.26
0.75 0.95 0.69 0.86 0.93 0.40 0.60 0.80 0.31
0.80 0.96 0.75 0.89 0.95 0.47 0.67 0.84 0.37
0.85 0.97 0.81 0.92 0.96 0.55 0.74 0.88 0.45
0.90 0.98 0.87 0.95 0.98 0.66 0.82 0.92 0.57
0.95 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.81 0.91 0.96 0.74
Prediction Pattern of the three Cues (c1=.75, c2=.65, c3=.55)
 
 
Figure 1.  Choice Tasks and Posterior Probabilities.  Manipulation of the base-rates (in rows) and cue 
pattern (in main columns) result in 152 choice tasks with different posterior probabilities.  Tasks with clear 
evidence for option A (p(A|evidence) > .66) are indicated green, tasks with clear evidence for option B 
(p(A|evidence) < .33) are indicated red. Tasks with inconsistent evidence (.33 ≤ p(A|evidence) ≤ .66) are 
indicated yellow.   
 
After each choice, individuals rated their confidence on a horizontal scroll bar ranging from -100 
(not confident at all) to +100 (very confident) and they were provided with feedback.  The 152 
tasks were computer-based and presented in individually randomized order (without practice 
trials).  In a post-test, participants were informed that they could earn an additional 2 Euros by 
providing the correct answer to another task.  In this test, we wanted to measure if individuals 
were able to determine the exact posterior probability after repeated feedback.  The post-test was 
essentially equivalent to the choice phase except that individuals judged the probability that the 
outcome of the gamble was A (not B).  Individuals had sufficient time and were informed that 
they could use pen and paper to do any calculations, if they wished.  We used slightly modified 
cue validities, which made it easier to calculate the posteriors because forecaster 3 could be ig-











Figure 2. Presentation format of choice task. 
 
Results and Interpretation 
For each choice, a Bayes_Correct score (0 = wrong, 1 = correct) was calculated, which coded 
whether the choice was in line with the Bayes’ solution or not (i.e., if the gamble with the higher 
posterior probability was selected).  For each of the 152 tasks, the posterior probability for option 
A was coded in the variable Bayes.  Furthermore, a task consistency score (Consistency) was 
calculated that indicates whether base-rate and cues clearly speak for one or the other option: 
Consistency = | 0.5 – Bayes |.  Hence, the Consistency score of each task is the distance between 
the posterior probability of the options and maximal uncertainty (.5) (see also Figure 1).  High 
consistency scores indicate that one option should be clearly preferred.  According to a PCS ap-
proach, Consistency should be inversely related to the difficulty of the task and correlate with 
Bayes_Correct, response time and confidence. 
Choice accuracy. The overall level of choice accuracy (i.e., proportion of choices in line with the 
predictions of Bayes’ theorem) was .86 (SE = .003).  All participants showed an astonishingly 
good performance of at least .73 (Figure 3, left) across all trials.  
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Figure 3. Observed performance of individuals (left) and performance predictions of different strategies 
(right).  The line in the right graph indicates mean observed performance of individuals.  
 
 
To test whether individuals might have applied simple heuristics or (as we assumed) used intui-
tion which approximates weighted linear information integration we simulated the performance 
of prominent strategies considered in the literature (Payne et al., 1988; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
1999) for the 152 tasks.  We simulated a lexicographic take-the-best model based on the most 
valid cue (TTB) and the base-rate (TTB(BR)), equal weight strategies based on cues only (EQW) 
and including the base-rate as cue (EQW(BR)) (without counting undecided cases), as well as an 
optimal weighted linear model (WADD) based on a linear regression with base-rate and the three 
cues as predictors (without constant).  Note that the estimated performance of WADD denotes 
the maximal performance with optimal weights.  Individuals which apply other weights score 
worse.  As expected, we found that the performance of WADD was very high indicating that an 
optimally weighted linear strategy can approximate the correct Bayes’ solution in 95% of the 
cases.  The performance of the other strategies was considerably lower (Figure 3, right).   
When comparing participants’ performance and the performance predictions of the strategies it 
can be seen that almost all participants performed better than the prediction of the best simple 
heuristic.  This supports our hypothesis that individuals have the cognitive capacity to solve 
complex Bayes’ tasks based on intuition approximating linear information integration.  
To jointly analyze the development of performance over time and the effects of our manipula-
tions, we conducted a repeated measurement logistic regression with Bayes_Correct as depend-
ent variable and Learning, Consistency and Trial Number as predictors (Table 1, top).
5   
                                        
 
5   In this and in all following analyses we used the STATA option Cluster to account for dependencies in ob-




Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Choice Accuracy (top) and Choices for 
Option A (bottom) (N = 101) 
 
Odds Ratio       SE   z   P>|z| 
Choice Accuracy 
Learning  Condition    1.01   0.099   0.06   0.950 
Trial  Number     1.00   0.001   0.67   0.500 
Consistency               22082.73          5747.17             38.43    0.000 
Choices for Option A 
Learning  Condition    0.97   0.050   -0.68   0.497 
Trial  Number     0.9987   0.001   -1.97   0.049 
Base-rate              289806.40          132639.8             27.48       0.000 
Forecaster 1 (75%)               50.25      10.49      18.76    0.000 
Forecaster 2 (65%)      6.19       0.65    17.26    0.000 
Forecaster 3 (55%)                 2.99     0.24        13.44    0.000 
 
Note. Choice accuracy (0-wrong, 1-correct) refers to choices in line with Bayes’ theorem, Pseudo R
2 = 
.23, Wald χ
2 (3) = 1487.35, p < .001 (top).  In the regression of choices for option A (0-no, 1-yes) Pseudo 
R
2 = .62, Wald χ
2 (6) = 927.85, p < .001 (bottom). 
 
 
In line with our expectations, participants showed more accurate choices with increasing Consis-
tency.  There was no effect of our manipulation of the learning condition, suggesting that the 
type of feedback (probabilistic vs. deterministic) made no difference in performance.  There was 
no effect of trial number indicating no learning effects over time (Figure 4). Interestingly, there 
was not even a significant difference in performance if one compares the proportion of correct 
answers in the first and the last of the 152 trials, Odds-Ratio=1.21, z=.69, p=.49.  Performance of 
our participants did not improve over time but was very high from the beginning, possibly indi-
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Figure 4. Development of performance over time. 
 
 
Choices. The proportion of choices for option A and the proportions of choices in line with the 
rational Bayes’ solution are shown in Figure 5.  The choice proportions almost exactly matched 
the posterior probabilities of the tasks (cf. Figure 1).  The correlation between choice proportion 
and Bayes’ posterior was r = .93, p < .001.  Deviations from the rational solution were mainly 
observed in the inconsistent cases (Figure 5, right) as indicated by a correlation of r = .71, p  
< .001, between consistency and proportion of correct choices.     
Figure 5 
 
A) Choice Proportions for Option A      B) Choices in line with Bayes’ Posterior 
 
Base-Rate A A-A-A B-A-A A-B-A A-A-B B-B-A B-A-B A-B-B B-B-B
0.05 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.10 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.15 0.30 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.41 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00
0.25 0.56 0.04 0.16 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.30 0.54 0.04 0.25 0.41 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00
0.35 0.64 0.03 0.41 0.52 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00
0.40 0.79 0.08 0.58 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.01
0.45 0.86 0.14 0.73 0.81 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.00
0.50 0.98 0.38 0.97 0.97 0.04 0.05 0.64 0.02
0.55 0.98 0.66 1.00 0.99 0.15 0.23 0.83 0.14
0.60 0.99 0.82 0.99 1.00 0.26 0.48 0.89 0.17
0.65 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.60 0.93 0.28
0.70 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.72 0.96 0.45
0.75 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.80 0.97 0.53
0.80 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.90 0.98 0.59
0.85 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.90 0.98 0.61
0.90 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.97 1.00 0.77
0.95 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.85
Prediction Pattern of the three Cues (c1=.75, c2=.65, c3=.55)
A-A-A B-A-A A-B-A A-A-B B-B-A B-A-B A-B-B B-B-B
0.83 1.00 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
0.76 1.00 0.96 0.88 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
0.30 0.99 0.94 0.76 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
0.41 0.97 0.88 0.23 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00
0.56 0.96 0.84 0.35 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
0.54 0.96 0.75 0.41 0.99 0.99 0.93 1.00
0.64 0.97 0.41 0.52 1.00 0.99 0.89 1.00
0.79 0.92 0.58 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.99
0.86 0.86 0.73 0.81 0.99 0.98 0.30 1.00
0.98 0.62 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.64 0.98
0.98 0.34 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.77 0.83 0.86
0.99 0.82 0.99 1.00 0.74 0.52 0.89 0.83
1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.40 0.93 0.72
1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.72 0.96 0.55
1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.80 0.97 0.47
1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.90 0.98 0.41
1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.90 0.98 0.39
1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.97 1.00 0.77
1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.85
Prediction Pattern of the three Cues (c1=.75, c2=.65, c3=.55)
 
 
Figure 5.  Choice proportions for option A (left) and deviation from rational norm of Bayes’ theorem (right).  
In the choice graph (left), tasks with choices mainly for option A (p(A) > .66) are indicated green, tasks 
with choices mainly for option B (p(A) < .33) are indicated red and tasks with inconsistent choices (.33 ≤ 
p(A) ≤ .66) are indicated yellow.  In the error graph (right) green, yellow, and red indicate high (pcor > .80), 
medium (.60 ≤ pcor ≤ .80) and low (pcor < .60) proportions of correct choices. 11 
To test our hypothesis that information was integrated in a weighted compensatory manner we 
conducted a logistic regression on choices using Learning, Trial Number, the base-rate for option 
A, and the forecasts of cue 1 to 3 (1 = option A, 0 = option B) as predictors (Table 1, bottom).  
We observed that base-rates had a strong effect on choices and that cue information from all 
three cues was considered.  The decreasing odds-ratios from cue 1 to 3 indicate that cues were 
weighted differently according to their cue validity (all three coefficients were significantly dif-
ferent from each other at p < .001).  This provides additional support for the hypothesis that 
choices are based on weighted compensatory information integration.  We can also reject the 
hypothesis that base-rates or cue information are neglected by participants.  
Response times and confidence. Overall, we observed very short response times.  Individuals 
integrated the base-rate probability and information from three probabilistic cues (according to 
their validity) in 2.2 seconds (median).  This makes it unlikely that choices are based solely on 
deliberate information integration (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c; for estimations of the time neces-
sary for deliberate decision making see also Lohse & Johnson, 1996) and supports the hypothesis 
that intuitive integration processes might have been used.  In line with the PCS hypothesis, par-
ticularly long response times were observed for inconsistent tasks (Figure 6, left).  The log-
means of individuals’ response time for the 152 tasks are correlated with Consistency at r = -
0.88, p < .001.  Participants showed moderately positive confidence ratings with a relatively high 
variance (M = 27.1, SD = 44.1).  The mean confidence ratings for the 152 tasks are shown in 
Figure 6 (right).  In line with the PCS hypothesis, confidence was particularly low in the incon-
sistent cases as indicated by a highly positive correlation between confidence and consistency, r 
= .87, p < .001. 
Figure 6 
 
A)  Response  Times      B)  Confidence  Judgments 
 
Base-Rate A A-A-A B-A-A A-B-A A-A-B B-B-A B-A-B A-B-B B-B-B
0.05 2.64 2.18 2.27 2.39 1.90 1.90 2.33 1.77
0.10 2.52 2.34 2.80 2.63 1.82 2.12 2.23 1.73
0.15 2.87 2.34 2.65 2.89 1.98 2.11 2.34 1.89
0.20 2.75 2.35 2.75 3.13 2.03 2.12 2.45 1.83
0.25 2.88 2.37 2.85 2.96 2.18 2.25 2.48 1.82
0.30 2.73 2.51 3.24 3.17 2.05 2.18 2.83 1.77
0.35 2.80 2.57 3.39 3.22 2.29 2.55 2.84 2.03
0.40 2.49 2.60 3.29 3.00 2.29 2.30 2.89 1.97
0.45 2.42 3.03 3.45 2.79 2.40 2.50 3.17 2.03
0.50 2.27 3.80 3.33 2.43 2.49 2.89 3.45 2.32
0.55 2.12 3.39 2.74 2.34 2.78 3.75 3.15 2.46
0.60 2.09 2.98 2.64 2.07 3.11 3.47 2.59 2.67
0.65 1.91 3.26 2.51 2.37 3.06 4.08 2.65 2.91
0.70 1.72 2.71 2.20 1.99 3.18 3.40 2.41 2.79
0.75 1.92 2.80 2.24 2.13 3.06 3.26 2.32 2.65
0.80 1.81 2.51 2.17 1.92 3.21 2.93 2.30 2.91
0.85 1.76 2.75 2.26 1.96 2.90 3.02 2.34 2.69
0.90 1.72 2.44 2.05 1.90 2.75 2.59 2.00 2.68
0.95 1.71 2.33 1.86 1.89 2.63 2.45 2.15 2.50
Prediction Pattern of the three Cues (c1=.75, c2=.65, c3=.55)
 
A-A-A B-A-A A-B-A A-A-B B-B-A B-A-B A-B-B B-B-B
9.15 51.22 44.33 28.43 75.66 68.93 49.42 84.82
8.34 48.85 26.78 20.61 65.46 58.26 46.70 81.50
-1.29 37.02 22.66 0.92 60.55 46.42 31.58 74.89
-1.73 39.48 10.64 2.91 55.19 47.74 33.96 71.08
-9.25 31.61 7.06 1.50 49.32 41.76 26.85 64.83
-1.63 27.31 1.73 -1.65 50.37 42.54 21.43 62.68
-5.30 19.81 -2.60 -9.19 38.23 31.60 9.15 53.96
-0.48 13.76 -7.11 -3.52 38.54 27.28 7.10 50.09
10.57 11.56 0.43 -1.64 25.87 18.05 2.80 38.59
20.04 -9.19 6.34 15.66 17.95 10.66 -6.61 25.45
42.87 -1.72 13.14 20.05 1.07 -3.97 0.69 9.23
49.75 3.31 25.03 32.62 0.46 -3.77 14.66 6.27
53.96 0.31 29.03 32.84 -3.31 -2.84 13.55 -1.12
63.50 12.35 39.59 44.60 -7.91 2.13 28.79 -7.50
64.95 16.80 43.76 52.89 -2.98 5.66 29.25 -6.70
69.93 22.74 46.08 56.69 3.96 12.72 32.22 -1.57
74.83 24.40 52.62 52.71 7.10 12.96 35.27 -1.83
80.36 39.54 60.37 69.10 10.45 30.77 42.29 13.65
84.10 44.94 65.30 74.79 26.87 32.64 52.40 15.79
Prediction Pattern of the three Cues (c1=.75, c2=.65, c3=.55)
 
 
Figure 6. Response times (left) and confidence judgments (right) for the 152 tasks.  In the response time 
graph (left) green, yellow, and red indicate low (t < 2.8s), medium (2.8s ≤ t ≤ 3.2s) and high (t > 3.2s) 
times. In the confidence graph (right) green, yellow, and red indicate high (c > 40), medium (10 ≤ c ≤ 40) 
and low (c < 10) confidence.  Post-test. Probability estimations from the higher incentivized post-test 
are shown in Figure 7. Although participants took considerable time to work on the post-test and some of 
them took notes to calculate the result, there was no participant who found the correct answer (i.e., .16).  
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Figure 7. Probability estimation in high incentivized post-test. 
 
We determined individuals’ hypothetical choices by dichotomizing probability ratings in estima-
tions below and above .50.  We found that according to their probability rating .37 of our partici-
pants would have preferred option A, which is clearly the non-preferable option.  This error rate 
is higher than the error rate observed in tasks in the choice phase that had comparable posterior 
probabilities.  Particularly, the proportion of erroneous choices for option A in the (nine) tasks 
with posterior probabilities between .15 and .20 was .06 which was significantly lower than the 
proportion in the post-test, χ
2(1, N=1007) = 106.7, p < .001.  Obviously, participants estimated 
worse when the response mode was judgment of probability (in contrast to choice) and the stakes 
were higher.  Keeping in mind that participants worked on slightly different tasks, this might 
indicate that both changes induced more deliberation and hampered the performance in tasks 
which had before been solved better by relying on intuition (cf. Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
Discussion 
The results show that individuals are able to integrate base-rates and multiple probabilistic cues 
in complex tasks rather quickly.  In line with our expectations, participants’ choices approxi-
mated the rational norms provided by Bayes’ theorem quite well, and the posterior probability of 
an option is highly correlated with the choice proportion for this option (r = .93).  Regression 
analyses showed that individuals took into account base-rates and information from all three cues 
according to their validity.  Hence, we observed neither base-rate neglect nor neglect of cue in-
formation.  The median decision time of 2.2 seconds makes it unlikely that these pieces of in-
formation were integrated using extensive deliberate calculations.  Specifically, the response 
time rules out that individuals deliberately applied Bayes’ theorem or explicit linear weighted 13 
integration rules (e.g., weighted additive strategy, Payne et al., 1988).  Thus, our results indicate 
that individuals might indeed rely, at least in part, on intuitive processes in base-rate tasks.   
In line with hypotheses put forward by Hammond et al. (1987) and derived from PCS models, 
these intuitive processes take into account information in a weighted compensatory manner that 
approximates rational choice surprisingly well.  Converging evidence for the view that individu-
als indeed applied intuition based on PCS mechanisms is provided by the significant correlation 
of consistency with error rate, response time and confidence.  Individuals almost instantly recog-
nize if the provided information is very clear (consistent) or equivocal (inconsistent) and adapt 
their response time and confidence ratings accordingly. 
The results of the post-test indicate that increasing deliberation can reduce choice accuracy.  Ac-
cording to the PCS model this could be explained by the fact that deliberation, although often 
being beneficial, can sometimes highlight specific but not necessarily relevant pieces of informa-
tion and thereby impair calibration of the mental representation (cf. Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, 
& van Baaren, 2006). 
Learning Effects and Adaptation of Mental Representations 
Possibly due to ceiling effects, we did not observe learning effects over time.  The calibration of 
the mental representation underlying individuals’ intuition was good from the beginning.  It was 
far above the maximal performance that could be reached with simple heuristics and quite close 
to the optimal linear approximation.  The good initial calibration might have been caused by the 
low context lotteries.  A worse calibration might be expected for materials that have been used in 
previous studies demonstrating base-rate neglect.  Note that our findings do not necessarily con-
flict with these findings.  We would, however, predict that bad calibration and base-rate neglect 
will quickly disappear after a few feedback trials.
6  
Approximating Rationality based on Intuition 
Our findings allow building bridges from psychology to (behavioral) economics.  The results 
suggest a pragmatic solution to the homo oeconomicus/bounded rationality controversy between 
psychological decision researchers and economists (cf. Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008; 
Smith, 2005).  The former postulate that an individual behaves approximately rational and 
chooses the option that maximizes its utility; the later state that for many problems humans’ cog-
nitive capacity might not suffice to conduct the necessary complex calculations.  We show that 
individuals are indeed able to approximate rationality on an individual level without having the 
                                        
 
6   In a recent study we replicated and extended the findings (Glöckner & Dickert, in preparation) and indeed 
observed lower performance in the first trials using the cab-accident-problem instead of the lottery task. 
These differences, however, were surprisingly small and disappeared quickly.  14 
ability for deliberately calculating the solution to the problem.  Well calibrated intuition seems to 
make this possible.  Hence, the rational choice assumption underlying economic modeling seems 
more psychologically plausible than usually assumed by decision researchers.  
In economics and psychology, judgments and decisions are often categorized into rational ones 
that are based on deliberation and irrational ones that are based on intuition and/or heuristics.  
Our results indicate that this categorization should be rethought: deliberate and intuitive decision 
making might both lead to (approximately) rational behavior or deviations from it.  It might be 
the core advantage of humans to be able to combine both kinds of processes to make good deci-
sions (approximate rationality) (Glöckner, 2008).  On the other hand, in line with the bulk of 
findings in psychological decision research (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982) our results show that 
individuals are not perfectly rational.  In many tasks, a considerable portion of individuals sys-
tematically selects the less likely option.  The expected error can, however, be quantitatively 
predicted by the distance of the posterior probability from .5.  Hence, behaviorally informed 
economic modeling could, instead of assuming completely rational choices, estimate choice pro-
portions and error rates based on posterior probabilities using Bayes’ theorem. 
In summary, our results show that intuition enables individuals to quickly come to choices in 
complex probabilistic tasks for which they are not able to (deliberately) produce a normative 
numerical solution.  Choices approximate rationality surprisingly well and choice proportions are 
predicted by the normative posterior probability according to Bayes’ theorem.  Response times, 
error rates and confidence judgments are compatible with the predictions of PCS models, which 
we suggest to be a promising approach for specifying intuitive information processing in com-
plex probabilistic tasks. 15 
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